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**May 26, 1955**

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SUBJECT: PERIPHERAL: Conversation with German Official Regarding Refugees, the Soviet Anti-Emigration Campaign and German Eastern Policy  
FRANKfurt-EPD  
Paris for WSC:incw

*44-6257*  
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REPORTER

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Refugees

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From ConGen, Munich

May 25, 1955

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION: Prof. G. VON MENDE, Büro für Heimatvertriebene  
Ausländer, Cecilienallee 52, Düsseldorf  
Robert A. Stevenson, Consulate General,  
Düsseldorf  
Allan G. James) Consulate General, Munich  
Ralph A. Jones)

An appointment for May 20th with Prof. von Mende had been made by letter from the Consulate General, Munich. The following interview took place on that date from 10:00 to 12:00 o'clock. Highlights of the interview were as follows:

Emigre Morale - Integration in Germany - German Official and Public Attitudes Towards Non-German Refugees

Prof. von Mende indicated his concern over the morale of non-German refugees in the Federal Republic and the exploitation of the situation of the non-German refugee by Soviet and satellite propaganda. He attributed the deteriorating morale of the non-German refugees to 1) their difficulties in integrating themselves in Western society, particularly in the Federal Republic where remaining refugees have been "picked over" for emigration and represent a "hard core", 2) the feeling amongst refugees that their homelands will not be liberated during their lifetime because rapprochement or, at least, co-existence with the communist bloc is the currently accepted prospect for years to come, and 3) the attitude in most Western countries, and particularly that in the Federal Republic, ranges from indifference to hostility towards refugees. Prof. von Mende said that these factors are the chief assets in the Soviet-satellite repatriation campaign, that most refugees want to return to a non-communist homeland but many have now lost hope that that will ever be possible during their lives. Meanwhile, their long years of hardship, camp life and uncertainty in West Germany have contributed to their unhappy state of mind and susceptibility to repatriation blandishments.

Prof. von Mende was asked whether, with the advent of sovereignty, the Federal Republic planned to undertake a more positive and co-ordinated program with regard to the non-German refugee problem. It was pointed out that the United States Escapee Program cannot be considered a permanent operation in its present scope and that, in any case, the question of integration and local settlement of refugees depends in the final analysis on German willingness and/or ability to absorb the "hard core" group. It was further suggested that a thorough survey by some German agency of employment and settlement opportunities for refugees would undoubtedly be welcomed by USEP - which, in turn, could apply its resources more rationally in the local integration field. Prof. von Mende replied that his Büro already has substantially the information which such a survey would reveal and that he has for some time been actively endeavoring to push local integration. He asserted, however, that he has encountered a serious obstacle in the attitude of German officials, as well as the German public, towards such integration. The German Ministry of Interior, according to Prof. von Mende, is the "hardest nut to crack". The "beams" in this Ministry, he said, refuse to see the broader aspects of the refugee problem and consider the refugee primarily as a troublesome, even suspicious, element.

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According to Prof. von Mende, Ministry of Interior officials consider repatriation one of the most effective methods of solving the Federal Republic's (non-German) refugee problem. They welcome the prospect of a freer hand in handling refugees (i.e., repatriating them) as the result of German sovereignty. Prof. von Mende said that there are already 2,000 Czechs registered with the Ministry of Interior for "voluntary" repatriation and that the Ministry is anxious to move the group as soon as arrangements can be made.

Prof. von Mende indicated that he has been endeavoring to make his own opinions on the refugee question known within the Interior Ministry, as well as elsewhere amongst German officials. In this connection he produced a copy of the "Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung" (No. 88/S.736 for May 11, 1955) in which there appears an article entitled "Homeless Foreigners and Non-German Refugees in Germany - The Integration Problem - Psychological Prerequisites and Difficulties" (Heimatlose Ausländer und nichtdeutsche Flüchtlinge in Deutschland - Die Frage der Eingliederung - Psychologische Voraussetzungen und Schwierigkeiten). Prof. von Mende said that this article is the text of a speech which he delivered recently to Ministry of Interior officials. (The article in the "Bulletin" does not bear the author's name.) A translation is attached to this memorandum.

Prof. von Mende remarked that, outside of the Interior and Refugee Ministries, there is no interest whatever amongst Federal officials in the non-German refugee problem and present communist bloc repatriation efforts. With a gesture of apparent impatience, Prof. von Mende said, "Brütigam and the others in Bonn can think of nothing else these days but the resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR."

Prof. von Mende elaborated on his opinions concerning the psychological problems involved in the refugee situation in the Federal Republic. His position and ideas in this regard are clearly set forth in his attached article and need not be repeated in this memorandum. However, with regard to refugee morale, it might be added that he described his own activity designed to stimulate official German participation and press coverage of emigre activities. He said that he has on several occasions arranged the personal participation of Federal Ministers as speakers or guests at emigre meetings and that he has been trying to interest the press and radio in broader and more sympathetic coverage of refugees matters. He said that he considers such a "show of interest" important to emigre morale. Prof. von Mende gave us printed invitations to the "German-Ukrainian Herder Society's" May 24th "Kulturtag" in Bonn, which he indicated is an example of his efforts to bring into emigre circles a number of high German officials. He also mentioned, in this connection, the May 25th Munich Franz Liszt festivities to be put on by the German-Hungarian Society.

Prof. von Mende said that another difficult problem is the attitude of local officials and the public towards emigres. He said he has been actively working with local officials in several places in the Ruhr where there are labor shortages. He has been successful in two communities in arranging for the resettlement from refugee camps of 20 or 30 families. He pointed

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out that resettlement has the best chance of success if it involves 1) prior arrangements with the local authorities and public, and 2) transfer of a group of refugees rather than isolated individuals. He emphasized the importance of enlisting the cooperation and cultivating the trust of the local officials and public previous to transfer of refugees into a community. The community usually has to have pretty strong reassurance that it is not acquiring a potential criminal or welfare problem. On the other hand, the refugees feel more confident and have more chance of succeeding in their new environment if they retain a certain group feeling and interest. Prof. von Mende stated that he believes assimilation to be neither possible or desirable; integration can best be accomplished by allowing the refugees to feel that they are not being swallowed up in an alien society but yet are welcomed as a useful and equal partner in that society.

Prof. von Mende said that he does not himself entirely exclude the idea of the repatriation of some refugees, providing they appear to want to go back. He admitted that all repatriates are potential propaganda tools on the other side of the iron curtain but said that he felt our efforts to prevent repatriation should be concentrated on those persons who are key figures in the emigration. The rank and file refugee, he said, also needs attention and sympathetic treatment. This may prevent his "voluntary" repatriation. However, Prof. von Mende, despite some argument to the contrary, did not seem to be concerned about the adverse effect of repatriation of the "small fry" unless it reaches mass proportions.

Prof. von Mende was told that emigres, especially those engaged in anti-bolshevik activity, seem to be generally unhappy about the "protection" they receive in the Federal Republic. It was stated that some emigres are known to have requested permission to carry firearms and Prof. von Mende was asked his opinion concerning possible security measures by German authorities with regard to those emigres who have been or might be the targets of Soviet provocation. Prof. von Mende replied that he was fully aware of this problem but that he could suggest no new measures which would increase the personal safety of emigres. He indicated that publicity of incidents in which agents have been apprehended (the Yakovlev-Reinhold case) or foiled in their movements is good for emigre morale. In this connection, he said that Veli KAJUM KHAN of the Turkestani National Unity Committee, with headquarters in Müsseldorf, had recently been trailed by an agent for several days. This person was apprehended by the police when he tried to gain access to Kajum Khan's mail box by bribing the janitor of the building in which Kajum Khan lives.

Prof. von Mende stated that local officials, usually the police, often take measures against "the wrong people". He said that local officials are often prone to defer to requests through "official channels". In Munich, for instance, a Croat emigre group was recently barred from engaging in certain public activity (which Prof. von Mende did not describe) because the Yugoslav Consulate there requested that the municipal authorities prevent this "unfriendly" activity. Prof. von Mende offered the opinion that such incidents can be expected to increase if Soviet and satellite consular or diplomatic missions are permitted in the Federal Republic. Prof. von Mende was asked whether he thought that actual repatriation missions

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will be allowed to operate in the Federal Republic or that the Committee for Return to the Homeland might be allowed to establish branches here. His answer was negative.

Prof. von Mende was informed that Andrei KOSSAREV of the Society of Victims of Communism has stated that he wants to be repatriated. Prof. von Mende expressed surprise but stated that this is a man whom he has never trusted. He said that Kossarev worked for the German "Abwehr" during the war and was sent through the Russian lines. He was apprehended by the Soviets but was released by them and returned to the Germans unharmed. Prof. von Mende said that Kossarev has never satisfactorily explained how he managed to be released and must have been working for the Soviets too. When it was mentioned that Kossarev has said that one of the "failures" he has experienced which contributed to his decision to return to the USSR is the refusal of the Kaiser Ministry to take his anti-communist posters, Prof. von Mende again expressed surprise. He said that the Ministry was actually working out a distribution scheme for the posters and had merely delayed its acceptance because it wished to make several changes in the posters themselves.

Prof. von Mende offered the opinion that Prof. Vasyl Dubrovsky of the Ukrainian Peasant Party will be a "voluntary" repatriate. He said that Dubrovsky is a man who has never fully adjusted himself to the West, that he is an "intellectual" whose life here is comparatively unfruitful, and that he is a good example of a "psychologically ripe" target for Soviet repatriation propaganda. Prof. von Mende was informed that Dr. Dubrovsky had received a letter from repatriate V. VASSILAKY shortly after the latter turned up in East Berlin and that Dr. Dubrovsky had shown this letter to the Consulate General, Munich. Prof. von Mende said that perhaps this was a good sign as to Dr. Dubrovsky's resistance to Soviet repatriation propaganda.

#### The Turkestani National Unity Committee and the Bandung Conference

Prof. von Mende asked Mr. Jones if Veli Kajum Khan of the Turkestani National Unity Committee had called on him in Munich. He said that he had sent Kajum Khan to the Consulate General, Munich to learn the facts concerning a Turkestani, Rusi NASAR, who had appeared at the Bandung Conference. Prof. von Mende was told that Kajum Khan had called at the Consulate General a few days before but that we were entirely/informed concerning the activity of Mr. Nasar. Prof. von Mende then said that Kajum Khan was disturbed that Nasar had represented himself at Bandung as a member of the Turkestani National Unity Committee and that Kajum Khan had no contact with or knowledge of the man. Prof. von Mende said that last/NASAR had also been at Mecca and had indicated there that he was sent by the Americans, that he was known to have received \$600 dollars from the CIA representative in the U. S. ~~Consulate~~ Embassy at Jidda. Prof. von Mende said that he was telling us this because he felt that it was against U. S. interests to have this kind of an operation bungled.

#### A Neutral Zone in Eastern Europe

Prof. von Mende said that he had been very much interested in the recent indications in the U. S. press that the United States might be

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officially considering a policy designed to create a neutral zone occupied by the present Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. He said that the possibilities for such a neutral zone cannot be entirely brushed off in view of the recent strengthening of the Western bloc by West German sovereignty and entry into NATO. He indicated his opinion that the Soviets are at present making certain concessions (Austria was mentioned) and that, if some are made on the other side, a new pattern in Europe is at least conceivable.

Prof. von Mende was asked his opinion concerning the solution of the German expellee problem if events should, in fact, permit the return of expellees to neutralized countries in Eastern Europe. He replied that this question was, of course, linked to the settlement of the future eastern boundaries of Germany. He said that he felt that Germany must permanently give up any idea of retrieving its extreme eastern territories but that he felt a line might be drawn somewhere slightly to the east of the present Oder-Neisse frontier. He suggested that such a line might begin in Pomerania at about Kdalin and join the Neisse at Gdrlitz in the south. Prof. von Mende said that any return of expellees could only be successful if the areas to which they returned were put under international administration such as that in the Saar. Return of expellees to areas entirely administered by the central governments of the east European states would inevitably result in resumption of the historic frictions between the German minorities and the local populace. Local cultural and ethnic autonomy would not be sufficient to solve these problems unless outside supervision were in effect. Prof. von Mende said that his opinions in this respect related primarily to Poland and not to the Sudetendeutsch question and Czechoslovakia. He added that another solution to the Sudetendeutsch problem would have to be found, probably along the old lines of local autonomy within the Czechoslovak political framework. However, he indicated that he felt that not more than 25% of the Sudetendeutsch (and he later included the Ostdeutsche from Poland) would return to their former homes.

Prof. von Mende said that he has followed with interest the efforts of the expellees to reach agreement with the emigre leaders from the East European satellites. He indicated that he was referring to rapprochement between the expellees and the emigres who represent the less extremist-separatist elements from Poland and Czechoslovakia. He said that HEMERICK of the Czechoslovak Alliance of Political Refugees had made a good impression in Bonn and among expellees and that perhaps some compromise between the Sudetendeutsch and the Czechoslovak emigres could be reached through HEMERICK and the Czechoslovak agrarians.

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(Translation)

Homeless Foreigners and Non-German Refugees in Germany

The Integration Problem - Psychological Prerequisites and Difficulties.

The group of homeless foreigners and non-German refugees comprises approximately 220,000 persons, i.e. no more than 0.5 percent of the Federal Republic's entire population. Toward these people the Federal Republic follows a policy of economic and social integration, it does not intend to assimilate them. On the contrary, it attaches great importance to their preserving, cultivating and further developing their national characteristics which are particularly manifested in language, culture and national history. These national groups are parts of the great family of nations which helped to create and form western history and culture. Moreover, they are representatives of their peoples and countries suffering under the Soviet yoke, in this divided world of ours. Therefore, in addition to our general human sympathy, they deserve particular political interest.

However, public opinion is, unfortunately, still prejudiced, and these prejudices can only be eliminated with the assistance of the press, lest the integration of homeless foreigners and non-German refugees be frustrated by those who would have to effect integration by procuring jobs and housing. However, it could also be delayed by a wrong view of facts on the part of homeless foreigners and non-German refugees.

In order to correctly judge this many-sided problem, we will explain in the following the various psychological prerequisites and difficulties which, according to our experiences during the past few years, have mostly had a negative effect upon the integration of homeless foreigners and non-German refugees.

These foreigners and refugees are not living in Germany on a voluntary basis, as for instance the emigrants to overseas countries, but they are forced to live in Germany by circumstances. As a result of these circumstances, these foreigners and refugees, from the very beginning, planned to remain in Germany for only a limited period of time and, hoping for an early change - be it return to their homeland or emigration to overseas countries - have been kept in a state of suspense. This suspense has had a negative effect on their integration into the German economy. Furthermore, international organizations like UNRRA and IRO, which cared for them until 1951, established a special status for these foreigners and non-German refugees isolating them from the average Germans. The effect of this isolation is even felt today. Some of these foreigners and refugees still feel themselves to be living under a special status, and, therefore, see no binding necessity to prepare themselves for a longer stay in Germany and to integrate themselves into the German economy. The excellent work of international organizations for homeless foreigners and non-German refugees should in no way

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be depreciated by this remark.

Emigration from Germany to other countries was effected under a program of specific selection. Only capable, healthy people were admitted while the old, sick and destitute had to remain in Germany as the so-called "hard core". This selective program has separated many families and the consequences are inhuman. For the foreigner who remained in Germany this selection has been very discouraging since he feels like a second-rate, good-for-nothing, abandoned and forgotten individual. Naturally, the German attitude is that capable forces whom Germany could employ just as well, were withdrawn from the German economy while Germany is required to take upon herself an additional social burden by caring for these old, sick and destitute foreigners, while her own social burden is already very heavy. This situation could not facilitate the rapprochement between the Germans and these foreigners and refugees. Even the Allied Labor Companies consisting in part of young foreigners and refugees, are composed of people sick with tuberculosis up to 60 percent and therefore forbidden to emigrate.

At the present time, emigration to overseas countries is handled on an individual and limited basis and this has a positive effect on the foreigner's and refugee's willingness to integrate because he now realizes the necessity to somehow permanently settle down in Germany.

During the last ten years these foreigners and refugees have had the natural desire to return to their homeland as soon as a political change took place. However, in spite of permanent world-political tension, this hope for an early return appears to become more and more illusory, and this fact also forces the homeless foreigner to settle down in Germany. In this connection we may draw attention to the process of disruption and disintegration within foreign and refugee circles which originated from the East. The ever-increasing cases of re-emigration, attempts at extortion and terror which appened during the last year, for instance the homicide case in Munich in November 1954, have resulted in creating unrest among the emigrants from the East in Germany. The general feeling is that this campaign is centrally directed and aims at disintegrating the East-Emigration and undermining the relations between homeless foreigners and non-German refugees and the western countries where they have found shelter.

May we mention three cases as examples of this process of fermentation: At the end of August, 1954, two Bulgarians, Mladeno and Trifuno, returned to their homeland. These cases were much publicized in the Bulgarian press. Bulgarians living in the Federal Republic received letters from these two men requesting their countryment also to return to their homeland.

In September, 1954, an old Georgian emigrant re-emigrated to the East. His appeals to his compatriots, which appeared in the Soviet

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newspapers "Kommunist" and "Zarja Vostoka", were recently sent in many copies to his Georgian countrymen living in Germany. The mere fact that all emigrant addresses are known in the East has created unrest in foreign and refugee circles.

Finally, we want to mention the Czech refugees who, according to all experience, are most susceptible to repatriation, possibly for two reasons. Their willingness to integrate into Germany is blocked by the Czech's resentment toward the Germans. New refugees are cared for by Czech exile organizations which do not always influence the newcomers favourably toward integration. Therefore, the re-patriation susceptibility of the homeless foreigner and non-German refugee in all respects corresponds to his lack of willingness to integrate into the German economy. The logical consequence is that German authorities must do everything in order to offer shelter to these people and to strengthen their morale.

It can generally be noticed that homeless foreigners and non-German refugees show an increasing willingness to remain permanently in Germany. It is greater among the younger generation than among the older one since the latter lost much more and has a smaller chance even approximately to regain its lost social and material position.

Germans should also consider the following points of view: In public these people are still very often referred to as "undesirable foreigners". Such generalizations should be avoided. There are certainly also unreliable elements among the foreigners and refugees. However, generally speaking, there are no more criminals among them than among the German population. Nor is it suitable to designate these people merely as "refugees"; they must be considered people having specific ties. We must not forget that sound national ties are natural prerequisites for every human being because he is born into a family and a nation. If he were deprived of this natural source of existence, he would be reduced to a rootless hybrid susceptible in every respect. On the basis of this recognition, integration should be effected very carefully in order not to lose the national values of the individual but to save and preserve them. It would be in nobody's interest to transform, for instance, a good Latvian into a bad German.

In this connection we want to draw attention to the school problem. With a view to their professions when grown up it would be more suitable to have them attend German schools. On the other hand, however, it is only natural that national emigre groups, above all the older generation, attach the greatest value to conveying to their children some of the national cultural heritage which for their parents had been such a self-evident factor in the course of life. Both requirements should be duly considered and an agreement satisfactory in both respects should be reached.

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Germans should, more than before, take into consideration that the homeless foreigner and non-German refugee has less chance to find a new start than the German refugee. He lacks the support of the family circle; he has no financial backing; he has to fight linguistic difficulties. It would be desirable that in the integration of homeless foreigners and non-German refugees into the German economy Germans do not leave everything to the German State, but that the individual German, as well, personally use all his influence in order to alleviate the situation of foreign refugees. Finally, it would be desirable that by mutual understanding the resentment still existing against certain national groups of the East-Emigration, a heritage from the past and also from postwar times, be abolished.

Merely psychologically speaking, the integration of foreigners and refugees would be a success if a far-reaching assimilation of interests and aims were reached between Germans and foreigners, i.e. in current discussions between the partners who are directly interested in the solution of these problems. Every attempt should be made to increase contacts between Germans, homeless foreigners and non-German refugees. At the same time, the latter should be given the feeling that they are not set aside but, like the Germans, are called upon to fulfill a task and that, after fulfilling their task, they will receive the same appreciation and be given the same chance as the Germans.

(Source: "Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung", No. 88/S.736, May 11, 1955)